Truth and Reconciliation Commission - Peru

Complete database of events related to the internal armed conflict in Peru, extracted from the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR). 5,159 events documented from 1817 to 2003.

Years All years
1817 2003
Tag military strategy × Browse all tags
  1. Women's Involvement in the Peruvian Internal Conflict

    During the Peruvian internal conflict, women, particularly widows and single mothers, were compelled to take on roles traditionally held by men, including self-defense and conflict resolution. In May 1993, Tarcila Rojas Llacctahuamán, known as Comanda Tarcila, became a commander of the Civil Defense Committees (CAD) in Ticllas, where women were …

    Ticllas, Peru 452
  2. Change in Counterinsurgency Strategy in Alto Huallaga

    In 1991, the Peruvian military implemented a new counterinsurgency strategy in the Alto Huallaga region to improve its image and regain state presence in areas occupied by subversive forces. The strategy focused on winning over the civilian population through supportive actions and effective intelligence work to isolate the PCP-SL. This …

    Alto Huallaga, Peru página 390
  3. The Beginning of the End for Sendero Luminoso

    In July 1990, the Peruvian government, under the direction of Interior Minister Mantilla, recognized a significant turning point in its fight against the insurgent group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). The intervention led by Mantilla marked a shift from a purely military approach to one that included intelligence operations. This change …

    Peru página 207
  4. Shining Path's Strategic Shift and the Rise of Campesino Resistance

    In 1990, Abimael Guzmán, leader of the Shining Path (PCP-SL), declared the completion of the 'strategic defensive' phase of their prolonged war, aiming to focus subversive actions in Lima due to setbacks in rural areas. The rise of 'rondas campesinas' and 'comités de autodefensa' marked a significant peasant resistance against …

    Peru Página 44-90
  5. Directive No. 017 of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces for Internal Defense

    In December 1989, the Peruvian military issued Directive No. 017, a strategic directive aimed at combating subversion within the country. Signed by General Artemio Palomino Toledo, the directive reorganized the military's approach to internal defense by establishing counter-subversive fronts and focusing on dismantling the military and political structures of subversive …

    Peru página 290
  6. Peruvian Military Strategy and Human Rights Violations

    In August 1989, the Peruvian armed forces implemented a new counterinsurgency strategy that aimed to eliminate Shining Path's political-administrative organizations rather than focusing on territorial control. This strategy led to significant changes, including increased support from the peasantry against Sendero Luminoso and the growth of self-defense committees. However, it also …

    Peru Párrafos 60-62
  7. Publication of the Manual de Ejército Guerra no Convencional Contrasubversión ME 41-7

    In June 1989, the Peruvian Ministry of Defense published the Manual de Ejército Guerra no Convencional Contrasubversión ME 41-7 in Lima. This document provided a comprehensive analysis of the subversive activities of the PCP-SL and the MRTA, detailing their organizational structures, tactics, and objectives. It also outlined the Peruvian military's …

    Lima, Peru Chunk 518.0
  8. The Disaster of Uchiza

    On 27 March 1989, the largest anti-narcotics police base in Peru, located in Uchiza, was attacked by hundreds of narcoterrorists armed with military-grade weapons. Despite being in contact with Lima and nearby military bases, the police received no assistance and eventually surrendered after sustaining significant casualties. This event highlighted the …

    Uchiza, Peru p. 59
  9. Critique of Counter-Subversive Strategy by DIRCOTE

    In a presentation at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares in late 1988, Palacios, a DIRCOTE official, criticized the lack of a cohesive counter-subversive strategy in Peru. He highlighted the absence of coordination among state organs, including police, military, and intelligence, and the government's failure to establish a comprehensive plan …

    Peru página 194
  10. Support for Fujimori's Coup d'État

    In 1989, the Peruvian Armed Forces redefined their counterinsurgency strategy to focus on intelligence and psychosocial operations. This new approach aimed to gain public support and neutralize insurgent actions while reducing human rights violations. However, it ultimately led to a deterioration of military ethics and undermined the democratic system, culminating …

    Peru 285
  11. Creation of the Comando Político Militar del Huallaga

    In 1989, during the presidency of Alan García, the Comando Político Militar del Huallaga was established as part of a strategy to combat subversive activities and narcotics trafficking in the region. This initiative included the installation of military bases and a shift in focus from persecuting coca farmers to targeting …

    Huallaga, Peru Página 360
  12. Military Strategy Shift in El Salvador

    In 1988, under the command of Colonel René Emilio Ponce, the Salvadoran military implemented a new strategy to counter guerrilla forces. This involved deploying small, specialized commando units into guerrilla-controlled territories for precise nighttime operations. The strategy also included civic actions aimed at replacing leftist social structures with new organizations, …

    El Salvador página 312
  13. Planned MRTA Attack on Concepción

    In 1987, the Peruvian Army received intelligence about the MRTA's plan to conduct a significant attack on Concepción, aiming for a more spectacular operation than their previous incursion in Juanjuí. In response, the Army mobilized two special operations detachments, each consisting of 100 soldiers, to strategically intercept and encircle the …

    Concepción, Peru CVR. BDI. Entrevista en profundidad P177, Jauja (Junín), 29 de mayo del 2002. Página 226
  14. Counter-Subversive Strategy and Civilian Impact in Peru

    During the internal armed conflict in Peru, civilians were coerced by the military to form self-defense committees or face severe consequences, including torture and execution. A shift in strategy led by Major Miguel Seminario Ayacuchano aimed to recover civilians from subversion rather than indiscriminately targeting them, encouraging defections from the …

    Chungui (La Mar), Peru página 113, Testimonio CVR 202660, Chungui (La Mar), 24 de septiembre de 2002
  15. Temporary Suspension of Military Patrols in Peru

    In 1985, upon assuming the presidency, Alan García Pérez identified the indiscriminate nature of military actions in Ayacucho, where reports indicated numerous alleged subversives were killed without evidence of confiscated weapons. This led him to temporarily suspend military patrols in emergency zones to reassess the counter-subversive strategy. This decision contributed …

    Peru Gráfico 4, página 137
  16. Formation of Self-Defense Committees in the Apurímac Valley

    In 1984, the Peruvian Marine Infantry organized the first self-defense committees in the Apurímac Valley. These committees, along with strategic population regroupings around Huanta, were part of experimental strategies executed outside the official policy, which was against mobilizing peasants and granting political authority to the military. Despite not reducing the …

    Apurímac Valley, Peru Chunk 502.0
  17. The Concept of Political Warfare in Taiwan

    In 1981, the concept of political warfare was discussed in Taiwan, emphasizing the strategic advantages gained not through direct military confrontation but through psychological and ideological influence. This approach, described as 'ideological total war,' aims to achieve political and military victories by altering the enemy's mindset and societal conditions, thus …

    Taipei, Taiwan p. 323

Showing 1–19 of 19 events