The Lure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru's Fight Against Shining Path

FOURTEEN YEARS AFTER a powerful rebellion spread fear and destruction throughout Peru, the commanding general of the Peruvian Army, Otto Guibovich, issued the following ominous warning: "If we don't do something, they will grow in number and we will realize we have our own FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)."1 Sendero Luminoso (SL) conducted a violent campaign of rural guerrilla war and urban terrorism from 1980 to 1995; however, its growth and expansion seemed to vanish in an instant with the capture of its leader, Abimael Guzmán. The rapid disintegration of SL was cited as an example of successful counterinsurgency; nevertheless, the current rising death toll and violence caused by the formerly dormant group call that conclusion into doubt. While the importance of the capture of SL's leadership is beyond question, recent events indicate that the fundamental problems that fueled the rise of the Sendero Luminoso insurgency are still latent. In order for the Peruvian government to defeat Sendero Luminoso and produce lasting stability, it must use a combination of enemy-focused and population-focused strategies.